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We review evidence that autistic spectrum disorders have their origin in early prenatal
failure of development in systems that program timing, serial coordination and prospective
control of movements, and that regulate affective evaluations of experiences. There
are effects in early infancy, before medical diagnosis, especially in motor sequencing,
selective or exploratory attention, affective expression and intersubjective engagement
with parents. These are followed by retardation of cognitive development and language
learning in the second or third year, which lead to a diagnosis of ASD. The early signs
relate to abnormalities that have been found in brain stem systems and cerebellum in the
embryo or early fetal stage, before the cerebral neocortex is functional, and they have
clear consequences in infancy when neocortical systems are intensively elaborated. We
propose, with evidence of the disturbances of posture, locomotion and prospective motor
control in children with autism, as well as of their facial expression of interest and affect,
and attention to other persons’ expressions, that examination of the psychobiology of
motor affective disorders, rather than later developing cognitive or linguistic ones, may
facilitate early diagnosis. Research in this area may also explain how intense interaction,
imitation or “expressive art” therapies, which respond intimately with motor activities,
are effective at later stages. Exceptional talents of some autistic people may be acquired
compensations for basic problems with expectant self-regulations of movement, attention
and emotion.
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INTRODUCTION TO A DIFFERENT, PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL
APPROACH
“Generality of the problem of Syntax: Not only speech, but all
skilled acts seem to involve the same problems of serial ordering
. . . Analysis of the nervous mechanisms underlying order in the
more primitive acts, may contribute ultimately to the resolution
even of the physiology of logic.”
(Lashley, 1951, pp. 121–122)
“A Different Approach to the Problem: In so far as an organ-
ism perceives a given object, it is prepared to respond with refer-
ence to it. This preparation-to-respond is absent in an organism
that has failed to perceive.”
(Sperry, 1952, p. 296)
Lashley (1951) and Sperry (1952) observed that perception, intel-
ligent action and thinking depend upon impulses that move the
body purposefully. The animal brain contributes systematic and
serial organization, in time and space, to muscle activity under
expectant perceptual and emotional control. It is always active,
not passively reactive to stimuli. Nor is the human brain ever
animated by thoughts of external events alone. All mental and
behavioral skills depend on preparation to respond with serial
ordering of acts. “The sole product of brain function is motor
coordination” (Sperry, 1952, p. 297). This is a psychobiologi-
cal theory of motives and affects in the mind, clearly articulated
before the advent of the “cognitive revolution” that divorced mind
from vital body in the 1960’s (Miller, 2003).
The motor theory of consciousness was inspired by the
research of Charles Sherrington (1906) on “the integrative action
of the nervous system.” It has support from developmental neuro-
biology and neuroembryology (Trevarthen, 1986a; Prechtl, 2001),
from ethology of the adaptive action patterns of animals and
how they communicate emotional evaluations for social cooper-
ation (Gallistel, 1980; Marler, 1984; Fentress and Gadbois, 2001;
Panksepp, 2005), and from infant psychology and communica-
tion (Trevarthen, 1986b, 2001a, 2009a; Stern, 2000, 2010).
Research focused on cognitive disorders of perceptual infor-
mation processing, selective awareness, and representational
thinking articulated in language, all of which skills develop after
infancy—disregards the developmental foundations of experi-
ence in motor coordination, and in the expression of vital states
as emotions for regulation of social life. In an animal’s perceived
world, its “Umwelt” (von Uexküll, 1957), conceptions of objects
are created by the intentional subject’s attempts to locate and per-
ceive “sign stimuli” detected in the environment by dedicated
receptors (Buchanan, 2008; Berthoz and Christen, 2009). Self-
regulation of knowing, with emotional assessments of risks and
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benefits, becomes in humans the source of cultural sign systems of
social cooperation—for sustaining health, for reproduction and
for learning how to use environmental resources collaboratively
(Sebeok, 1990; Trevarthen, 1990; Stern, 2010; Porges and Furman,
2011).
We relate autistic disturbance of cognitive functions to growth
errors in creative agency attributable to events in brain develop-
ment of embryo, fetus and infant (Trevarthen et al., 1998, 2006;
Trevarthen, 2000; Trevarthen and Daniel, 2005; St. Clair et al.,
2007). We address development of the autopoetic subcortical neu-
robiology that makes possible manifestations of intentions and
emotions before birth (Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2013), and
the cooperation of movements after birth within an intimate
infant-parent intentional system (Sander, 2008), which sustains
itself by the primary emotional processes of consciousness (Solms
and Panksepp, 2012). The motivation of the developing human
organism is environment expectant, ready for sharing agency and
emotions in movement, but this sharing is “anoetic”; that is, not
dependent on acquired categorical knowledge of the structure
and uses of the environment (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp,
2011). The infant is adapted physically and motivated psycholog-
ically to receive not only vital care in attachment to the mother,
but also “companionship” for the young mind’s growing pur-
poses in imaginative movement and the uptake of new experience
(Trevarthen, 2005, 2013). Shared health and meaning are created
in human awareness by primary processes of joint agency and
emotional sympathy between the movements of human bodies
(Trevarthen, 1986b, 2012; Reddy, 2008; Stuart, 2010).
We need to have a clear conception of the nature of animal
movement and its affective sociability if we wish to understand
how children with autism fail to organize and time their move-
ments effectively, hesitate to become affectively engaged with their
parents as infants (Muratori and Maestro, 2007), and fall behind
their peers in learning how to share and use knowledge of the
human world playfully (Reddy et al., 2002).
Based on evidence of early neural growth errors in core brain-
stem systems during fetal ontogenesis, and on new evidence of
disturbance of primary prospective motor control of expressive
action, we present the following hypothesis on the etiology of
autism for testing and argument:
(1) A primary cause of autism spectrum disorders is an error in
early growth of intrinsic motive and motor systems of the
brainstem during prenatal ontogenesis.
(2) This interferes with efficient integration of sensory informa-
tion with motor timing, and is accompanied by disturbance
of autonomic functions, disrupting timing and control of
prospective sensory perception in movement as well as vital
regulation of functions within the body. All these disorders
become most obvious in early childhood, when a toddler
normally gains many new powers of movement in engage-
ment with the environment, including speech.
(3) Social isolation, socio-emotional and cognitive delay, and
language disorder in children and adults with autism are sec-
ondary consequences developed within socio-emotional sys-
tems as experience-dependent compensations for primary
sensori-motor and affective integration errors and poorly
regulated motor intentions. These compensations are elab-
orated mainly by cortical systems that grow after birth.
AUTISM IS A DISORDER OF SELF-RELATEDMOTOR-AFFECTIVE
PROCESSES,WHICH CONTROL DEVELOPMENT OF SHARED COGNITIVE
REPRESENTATIONS
People diagnosed as autistic exhibit disabilities in regulation of
the order and timing of moving, in the feelings of their bod-
ies and emotional control, in selective expectation of objects
for experience, in attention to other persons expressions, in
the playfulness and humor of their social engagements, and in
collaborative learning (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Reddy et al.,
2002, 2010; Rogers and Williams, 2006; Mundy et al., 2009;
Hobson and Hobson, 2011; Torres, 2013). cognitive disabili-
ties attributed to failure in special modular mental functions of
perceptual selection, of conceptual grouping, or of a capacity
to conceive and think about the emotions behind other per-
sons” face expressions, orientations and practical actions, or to
imagine the representational contents of their minds (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Frith, 1989/2003; Morton, 2004), may only
be identified after infancy. Similarly, definition of autistic dis-
turbance by reference to neuropsychological tests that identify
faults in praxis, gnosis, reasoning and language in adults after
local brain injury ignores the large transformations in brain
function and behavior that take place during psychological devel-
opment (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009; Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith,
2002; Karmiloff-Smith, 2009).
We propose that faults in higher mind functions of per-
sons with autism arise out of disorder in the early development
of primary, non-reflective sensori-motor factors that regulate
moving-with-awareness of an integrated Self. These affect vital-
ity dynamics, the qualities of motor control that express essential
expectancies of action and enable communication of emotion
in purposes (Stern, 2010; Gowen, 2012; Gowen and Hamilton,
2013; Rochat et al., 2013). The primary processes of mental
agency do not require conceptual representation or explicit ref-
erence to external events; they are primary conscious experience
(Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011). Growth errors found in
formation of brain stem motor control and emotional systems of
the embryo and fetus (Prechtl, 2001; Rodier and Arndt, 2005),
interfere with the maturation of sensory-motor skills at signif-
icant periods in a child’s early life, impairing cultural learning
mediated in postnatal elaborations of the neocortex and depen-
dent on creative emotional engagement with human company
(Trevarthen et al., 2006). Interpreting autism in these terms
requires attention to the environment–expectant processes of
morphogenesis by which human bodies and brains are formed in
utero, with special adaptations for intersubjective communication
(Trevarthen, 2001a,b), and information on how additional brain
networks grow and learn after birth (Thomas and Karmiloff-
Smith, 2002). This is a “developmental psychobiology,” not a
“developmental cognitive neuroscience” based on the neuropsy-
chological definition of disorders inferred retrospectively from
effects of damage to parts of the adult brain (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2000). Psychological theory must also explain how individuals
with high-functioning autism and Asperger’s disorder perform
certain feats of perception or action with remarkable precision,
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but with inadequate awareness of the context, or “weak central
coherence,” in their self-related conceptions and plans for action
(Frith, 1989/2003; Rinehart et al., 2001).
No single genetic, neurobiological or environmental factor
has been identified as the cause of autism, which is also not
attributable to the loss of a single cerebral function or capac-
ity (Bauman and Kemper, 2005; Aitken, 2010). The complex
and varied cognitive problems of people with autism, and the
abnormalities in habits of action and of social response or use
of language, are consequences of core disabilities, manifestations
of which might be recognized, and compensated for, in infancy,
before the development at the end of the first year of “joint
attention” (Trevarthen, 2000).
A new scientific recognition of these core disabilities in autism,
and their relationship to imagination for action and to qualities of
movement, is emerging from attention to the emotions that eval-
uate other persons actions (Hobson, 1993, 2002/04; Reddy et al.,
2002, 2010; Reddy, 2008; Hobson and Hobson, 2011), and from
a brain science of intentions in movement and the intersubjec-
tive sharing of their dynamics of expression (Gallese, 2006; Stern,
2010; Gowen, 2012; Gallese andRochat, 2013; Rochat et al., 2013).
AUTISM COMPROMISES AFFECTIVE SHARING, AND REQUIRES
CREATIVE RESPONSE TO THIS
When Leo Kanner (Kanner, 1943) distinguished “autistic dis-
turbances of affective contact” in 1943, he accentuated that the
disorder is emotional. Hobson and Hobson (2011) quote exam-
ples from Kanner’s sensitive case studies that identify a difficulty
in engagement with other person’s intentions, experiences and
feelings. Kanner also recorded that parents of these children were
often concerned from the first year about their child’s detach-
ment or aloneness. Reddy (2008, 2011) cites a large number of
studies that prove normally developing infants “know minds”
and learn complex cooperative activities by deliberately engaging
playfully and inquisitively with the way other persons display their
interests, experiences and feelings. This eagerness for enjoyment
of shared experience, a sympathetic activity, which goes beyond
“joint attention to objects,” is weakened in autism.
The cognitive deficiencies of autism measured by tests of per-
ceptual recognition, rational choice, and language are skills that
must be gained by learned accommodation to objective experi-
ence, and normally depend on deliberate adult instruction. But all
can be attributed to deep subjective causes that impair imagina-
tive moving, the pleasures of the body in explorative action, and
a motivation to deliberately share this “seeking” in inventive and
playful, assimilatory, communication, going “beyond the infor-
mation given” (Bruner, 1974). It appears likely that autism results
from disorders of imaginative and sociable playfulness itself, for
which the motives and emotions are apparent from birth. Such
disorders can be traced back to creative developments of move-
ment and awareness in body and mind before birth (Trevarthen
and Delafield-Butt, 2013), to disorders of sensory-motor circular
reactions that become the tools for mastery of engagement with
the world (Piaget, 1951, 1954) and for the development of shared
cultural understanding (Baldwin, 1902).
Though some medical treatments lead to improvements in
associated conditions, there is no drug or surgical intervention for
autism. A prescribed course of training or instruction in behav-
iors, cognitive abilities or communication by learned symbolic
languagemay help, but can have adverse consequences, increasing
the subject’s anxiety, isolation and dependency (Trevarthen et al.,
1998). Moreover, the activity, cognitive capacities, relationships
and emotional well-being of a child or older person with autism
can be improved by a variety of non-verbal, non-cognitive activ-
ities in which a therapist, who engages sensitively with the indi-
viduality of their impulses and felt experiences, accompanies the
autistic person in the emotions of intimate engagement to more
productive and less defensive states of activity and awareness. This
type of relational and creative “art” therapy, which responds to
and guides the primary actions, interests and feelings of individ-
uals with autism, much as mother engages her affections with
her animated infant from birth, can benefit language learning
and both social and practical education (Malloch and Trevarthen,
2009; Stern, 2010).
Evidence that autistic behaviors express abnormalities of pre-
natal development of the brain stem (Rodier and Arndt, 2005)
relate to evidence that early postnatal communication, if it is
to support social and cognitive development, must be ready to
protect the infant against autonomic reactions of protective with-
drawal and depression, as well as to support positive initiatives
promoting advances in social communication (Panksepp and
Sahley, 1987; Panksepp and Watt, 2011; Porges, 2011; Porges and
Furman, 2011). Infant psychology and paediatric practice have
been transformed by abundant confirmation that precise coordi-
nation of well-formed intentions, interests and feeling may occur
within the child and between the child and an attentive and affec-
tionate adult from the neonate stage (Brazelton andNugent, 1995;
Trevarthen, 1977, 1998, 2009a; Stern, 2000; Sander, 2008; Nagy,
2011). This is the arena in which we must be alert for weaknesses
in developing human sense and for special support it may need
from the parental and social environment (Narvaez et al., 2013).
PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF HUMANMENTAL FUNCTIONS
DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROBIOLOGY OF SELF-CONSCIOUS INTENTIONS
WITH EMBODIED FEELINGS, AND SOCIAL AWARENESS
Evidence concerning the generation of animate intentions, aware-
ness and emotion in deep processes of the brain (Panksepp
and Biven, 2012) questions the “thalamo-cortico-centric” the-
ory of conscious awareness, thought and memory, which focuses
on abilities that depend on learned definition of objects from
information picked up outside the body, on the routines of fine
articulate skills for using the environment, and on educated con-
ventions of representation and reflective thought about objective
information. Functional brain research shows that the primate
neocortex is excited to regulate motor activities prospectively in
reference to their goals, seeking perceptual confirmation by imag-
inatively simulating the completion of the action within an estab-
lished context of multimodal information (Fogassi et al., 2005;
Pezzulo et al., 2008; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009; Hesslow,
2012; Gallese and Rochat, 2013). The process of intending to act
in a particular way is not a consequence of backward coupling of
frontal cortex “executive functioning” to recollections of the past
objects and events mediated impersonally in the temporal lobe.
It is the product of a forward-looking creative imagination that
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builds an episodic memory of past events related to an intentional
personal self (Tulving, 2002), with an autopoetic imagination
equipped from the start with “implicit experiential and pro-
cedural memory processes that generate non-reflective qualia”
(Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011, p. 7).
These animating functions of the primate brain mediate inter-
subjective coordination of self-related experiences in intimate
direct communication of purposes and feelings with others. The
anticipations of experience are charged with emotional values
linked in the brain stem with autonomic regulation of vitality
within the body (Damasio, 2010; Solms and Panksepp, 2012),
and these affections are communicated between subjects by a
reciprocal sympathetic cooperation of purposes and experiences
(not a one way imitation or shadowing of emotional processes
now commonly called “empathy”). Human relationships and
mutual awareness depend on relational emotions that promote
social cooperation in performance of creative actions and think-
ing, to increase collective well-being (Stern, 1993; Hobson, 1993,
2002/04; Trevarthen, 2009a).
The well-coordinated performances and expressions of affect
of newborn infants in expectant orientation to real or imag-
ined objects, and to persons (Trevarthen, 1984, 1986b; Nagy,
2011), the development of intentional movements and rhythmic
emotional expressions of fetuses (Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt,
2013), and the behaviors of anencephalic children (Merker, 2007)
support phylogenetic evidence that primary conscious states and
emotional evaluations, which are essential regulations in all goal
directed consciousness, are indeed first generated and regulated
sub-cortically (Solms and Panksepp, 2012), without neocortical
involvement. These motor-emotional systems are elaborated in
the orbito-frontal cortex and the temporal lobe of human beings,
which continue to develop to adult stages (Schore, 1994, 2005).
Before these developments they play a central role in maternal
care, and in the repair of emotional disorders (Schore, 2003).
Affective self-regulation and emotional communication to reg-
ulate engagement with other individuals have evolved in verte-
brates by elaboration of intrinsic neurochemical systems in the
brain stem linked to the hypothalamus (Trevarthen et al., 2006).
Regulation by the vagal nerve of essential self-related vital pro-
cesses of heart activity, respiration and feeding is adapted for
intersubjective coordination in the primate social brain by means
of communication employing expressive movements of eyes, face,
and vocalization. Throughout development of a child, from the
time of maternal support of the infant through birth and nursing,
there is a dynamic process that balances changes in self-regulation
against the need for collaborative regulations of relationships with
other persons in various degrees of intimacy (Porges and Furman,
2011; Carter and Porges, 2013). These have particular significance
for identifying and explaining autism (Patriquin et al., 2013).
The importance of rhythmic emotionally expressive hand ges-
tures in human communication from infancy (Trevarthen, 1986b;
Trevarthen et al., 2011), indicates that forebrain systems for guid-
ing action of the hands in complex manipulations have been
recruited into the brain stem and limbic systems for assisting
autonomic regulations by self-touching or holding and further
adapted to the service of social coordination. Hands are part
of the human emotional motor system (Holstege et al., 1996).
Indeed, movements of “mimesis” for social celebration in dance
and song, appears likely to have preceded evolution of speech
and contributed to its power to communicate thoughts as Homo
sapiens sapiens evolved (Donald, 2001; McNeill, 2005; Mithen,
2009; Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2013). The roots of this human tal-
ent for expressive gestural mimicry is apparent in infancy and an
essential contributor to the intimacy of parental care (Trevarthen,
1999, 2013; Dissanayake, 2000).
Both gestural and linguistic languages develop in intense
interpersonal communication mediated by vitality dynamics and
expressions of emotional investment that provide a basis for
the transmission of more differentiated semantic references by
symbols (Stern, 2010; Lüdtke, 2012). Dynamic communications
carried by consistent innate measures of moving in time (Pöppel
and Wittmann, 1999), over intervals from fractions of a second
to minutes and longer, are cultivated in all human societies in
the arts of music, dance and theatre. They begin as a universal
human regulation of rhythms of the mind or “biochronology,”
active before birth and elaborated in the communicative musical-
ity and rhythmic action games parents play with infants in the
middle of the first year (Trevarthen, 1999, 2009b; Malloch and
Trevarthen, 2009).
Autistic children show abnormalities in production and recep-
tion of communication by both speech and gesture, and in writing
(Rapin and Allen, 1983).
THE NEUROLOGY OF COMMUNICATION BY TRANSFER OF THE
DYNAMICS AND FORM OF INTENTIONS AND FEELINGS IN MOVEMENT
New data from social neuroscience confirm the “common sense”
that we are aware of other person’s states of mind by immediate or
direct engagement with the Other’smotor intentions, by whatever
modality or movement these intentions are expressed, matching
them by instantaneous “affect attunement” (Stern, 1993, 2010) to
the animation by which we generate intentions of our own Self
(Gallese, 2006; Bråten, 2009). Sensitivity for the intentions, inter-
ests and feelings of other individuals, for the social affordances
of their behaviors, must depend upon matching regulatory pro-
cesses that govern the rhythm or pulse and expressive tonality
or quality of movements of the human body as well as by “mir-
roring” their body-related form (Trevarthen, 1986b, 1999; Stern,
2010).
Regions in the adult cerebral hemispheres of a monkey or
human being that are sensitive to organism-object relations, and
that respond selectively to perceived capacities for action of the
self, also respond to the possible actions available to, and enacted
by others (Gallese, 2007). The same neural system is respon-
sible for perceiving one’s own possibilities for action and the
possibilities for action of another. Direct intra-personal neural
resonance within the “mirror neuron system,” reflecting the Self,
gives one individual direct inter-personal access in “felt imme-
diacy” (Bråten, 2009) with intentions in the mind of an Other
made manifest in their body movement, in “intersubjectivity”
(Trevarthen, 1979, 1998; Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001). Further,
data from imaging of brain activities show there exists substan-
tial overlap in activity of this system for awareness of actions
with activity excited by merely thinking about an intentional act
(Decety and Grezes, 2006).
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Direct resonance between preparation, execution, observation
and thought in action depends on “motor images” (Bernstein,
1967), which underpin perception, observation, and planning
of goal-directed action, and also integrate Self-related experi-
ence (Llinàs, 2001; Northoff and Panksepp, 2008). An amodal
perception-action system is also the means by which complex
embodied human intentions may be communicated between
agents across many channels of expression, in a “consensual-
ity,” which, when further elaborated and mediated by language,
becomes a tool for sharing abstract concepts and plans (Maturana
et al., 1995).
Disruption of the neural systems of motor planning in time
and space, by epigenetic dysregulation of early development in
the brain stem, or by environmental insult to the growing brain,
will have pervasive effects in maturation of consciousness, behav-
ior and social engagement, such as occurs in autism (Aitken and
Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen et al., 1998; Trevarthen, 2000).
PRENATAL GENESIS OF AUTISM
Wehave described the coordinative mechanisms in the brain as an
“intrinsic motive formation” (IMF), “ready at birth to share emo-
tion with caregivers for regulation of the child’s cortical devel-
opment, upon which cultural cognition and learning depend.
. . . many psychological disorders of childhood can be traced to
faults in early stages of brain development when core motive
systems form.” (Trevarthen and Aitken, 1994, p. 597). The IMF,
laid out in development of the fetus, is a core component of all
of the sensory-motor mechanism of human communication—by
gesture and dance, speech and song, or by writing, playing musi-
cal instruments and other manual or digital media (Trevarthen,
2001a,b). Rodier and Arndt (2005) relate autistic behaviors that
limit expressive movements of the eyes, face and vocal produc-
tions, and anticipatory attention to expressive movements of
other persons, to malformation in the embryo of core regulatory
systems in the midbrain, the brain stem visceral efferent and affer-
ent nuclei, and the olivary nuclei and cerebellum. They conclude,
“there is no region but the brain stem for which so many lines
of evidence indicate a role in autism” (Rodier and Arndt, 2005,
p. 146).
IMAGINATIVE INTENTIONS AND EMOTIONS OF THE PRIMARY SELF
There has been, in the last two decades, a highly significant re-
evaluation of the relationship between emotion and cognition,
and their functional inseparability in human experience and in
communication at all stages of development (Damasio, 2010;
Panksepp and Biven, 2012). Comparative studies of the mam-
malian emotional system demonstrates that an affective core sense
of the Self (Northoff and Panksepp, 2008; Solms and Panksepp,
2012) does not depend on learned conceptual knowing. This
“anoetic” consciousness of a live body (Vandekerckhove and
Panksepp, 2011) develops before a child becomes familiar with
the external world through practice of intention and testing of
actions which explore the affordances of situations and objects.
At all stages of the development of human conscious intelligence
this mobile self-with-feelings remains active, generating an innate
spatio-temporal context for the arousal of movements to engage
with the environment, and affective values for sustaining core
vitality (Stern, 2010). From mid gestation through infancy the
developing self is sensitive to other persons’ responses to its activ-
ities and vitality, first showing signs of vital state to achieve shared
“amphoteronomic” regulation of its own autonomics with those
of the mother. After birth the infant signals its own rhythmically
intended and affectively measured acts in responsive ways that
lead to the “synrhythmic” communication for cooperative learn-
ing and cultural development (Maturana et al., 1995; Donald,
2001; Trevarthen et al., 2006; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009;
Porges and Furman, 2011).
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN AGENCY IN INFANCY, AND
BEFORE BIRTH
MEASURES OF INFANT SENSORY-MOTOR INTELLIGENCE,
SELF-REGULATION AND SOCIABILITY
Movements of a baby under 2 months old are coordinated and
integrated within a rhythmic awareness of a single intentional
subjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979, 1984). These movements were
described by Prechtl (2001) and Einspieler and Prechtl (2005)
as “general movements” (GM), which, “involve the whole body
in a variable sequence of arm, leg, neck, and trunk movements.
They wax and wane in intensity, force and speed, and they have a
gradual beginning and end. Rotations along the axis of the limbs
and slight changes in the direction of movements make them
fluent and elegant and create the impression of complexity and
variability. If the nervous system is impaired, GMs loose their
complex and variable character and become monotonous and
poor.” (Einspieler and Prechtl, 2005, p. 61). General movements
are not precisely focused, intentional and directed by discrimina-
tion of discrete objects, but they can orient head, eyes and limbs
to external events in coordinated sequences within a body-related
space (Trevarthen, 1984). Visually directed reaching in newborns
compensates for changes in the “load” of a limb, which proves
the responsiveness of this non-reflex imaginative coordination
to proprioceptive reafference, or “body self awareness” (Van der
Meer et al., 1996).
A newborn infant’smovements are especially sensitive to sight,
hearing and touch of an attentive the mother in face-to-face
engagement, and they can take a creative part in a shared nar-
rative of expressive action (Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013).
Her voice was learned in utero (DeCasper and Fifer, 1980) and its
sound motivates rapid visual learning of her face. Imitation tests,
made with care to allow the infant to focus attention and regulate
a state of responsive arousal, prove that a newborn can initiate
eye-movements, face expressions, vocal sound patterns and hand
gestures of another person (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; Maratos,
1982; Field et al., 1983; Heimann et al., 1989; Kugiumutzakis,
1999; Nagy and Molnar, 2004; Nagy, 2011). These behaviors
signaling a “second person other-awareness” are adapted for shar-
ing curiosity for others’ mental states of interest and affective
appraisal (Reddy, 2011).
At 2 months, after a period of rapid maturation of sub-cortical
and cortical visual-motor regulations of foveal sight (Trevarthen,
1986a), the infant’s precisely timed responses of looking, smiling,
and vocalization give evidence of preparation for sharing ritual
practices and language (Bateson, 1979). Electroencephalic data
on the activity of a 9-week-old infant’s brain when looking at
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the photograph of a woman’s face (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002)
confirmed that complementary neocortical areas in left and right
brain, which 2 years later will become involved in a child’s learn-
ing of expression and reception of spoken language, are already
components in cerebral regulation of interpersonal contact by a
“social brain,” long before the training of a “social intelligence”
by life with other persons (Frith and Frith, 1999). The subcorti-
cal visual and auditory systems that mature from the early fetal
period show an asymmetry related to differences in left and right
parts of the brain stem thatmediate in complementary autonomic
regulations (Trevarthen, 1996). Schore (1994, 2005) proposes that
the early developing right brain motivates shared learning of per-
ception and articulation of meaning in language when the left
cerebral hemisphere shows an acceleration of growth in the sec-
ond and third year, the period when diagnosis of autism becomes
possible.
Developments around 3–5 months correlate with more dif-
ferentiated movements of the baby’s extremities when new neo-
cortical sensory-motor functions are developing. Einspieler and
Prechtl, label these subtle gestures “fidgety,” and describe them
as, “small movements of moderate speed with variable accelera-
tion of neck, trunk, and limbs in all directions” (Einspieler and
Prechtl, 2005, p. 61). They lead the infant to make more dis-
criminating orientations of head, eyes and hands intending to
reach for and touch or take hold of objects at a distance from
the body, and are accompanied by a fall in attention to the
mother. This incites the mother to be more animated and play-
ful, and to incorporate the baby’s selective interest in objects into
“person-person-object” games (Hubley and Trevarthen, 1979;
Reddy, 2011).
PROGRAMMED DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFANT-PARENT SYSTEM
Longitudinal studies of developments in actions, perception and
communication in the first two years, with information on inter-
nally regulated brain growth changes, confirm that there are
transformations in the motives and emotions of the child for
collaboration with parental care (Trevarthen and Aitken, 2003).
Sander’s studies of infants with their mothers from birth over
the first 36 months showed that growth of a human life is sus-
tained by a series of stages of adjustment within a system of
human-to-human engagement (Sander, 2008). Both mother and
child are significant actors, but in the creative process of devel-
opment the child must normally set the pace and the times of
important advance. Brazelton extended Sander’s system approach
to an interpersonal paediatrics accepting the conscious and per-
sonal powers of the newborn, and defining “touch points” in the
developing life with parents and in the community (Brazelton
and Nugent, 1995; Brazelton and Sparrow, 2006). Periods of
change in developing powers that are both sensitive and signifi-
cant, are symptoms of advances inmotivation for learning and for
communication (Johnson, 2005). Their consequences depend on
collaboration with parents who are “attuned” to the infant (Stern,
2000), and both intimate and playful in their accommodation to
the child’s impulses.
Data from a review of the literature on changes in the child’s
psychology and brain over the first 18 months (Trevarthen and
Aitken, 2003) point to natural emergence in the child of new levels
of mastery of action and awareness at around 6 weeks, 4 months,
7 months, 9 months, and between 15 and 18 months. These
agree with longitudinal studies of infant’s capacity to take initia-
tive in joint activities (Trevarthen, 1977; Hubley and Trevarthen,
1979; Reddy, 2011). These five advances in adaptive processes
correlate with temperamental changes commonly referred to as
“regressions.” They adapt to cultural differences in the frequency
of parental initiatives or directives (Reddy et al., 2012). They
are products of the active system of “intent participation” in
the environment with companions that drive cultural learning
(Trevarthen, 2013).
SENSORI-MOTOR INTENTIONALITY BEFORE BIRTH: GENESIS OF
PRIMARY SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE FIRST INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Spontaneous movements develop in the late embryo and
fetus, showing increased sensory awareness of their purposes
(Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2013). The first integrative
actions of the nervous system are to move the body, and the
first nerve tracts in the central nervous system are those that
will activate movements to express different orientations and
emotional states (Trevarthen, 1986a). After 8 weeks the core neu-
rochemical systems of the subcortical brain that will link motor
centers and select and evaluate experiences throughout life make
their appearance. At this stage the fetus makes the general move-
ments of Prechtl (2001). These become increasingly differentiated
and controlled with the benefit of re-afference from sensory
systems that grow in the following weeks. Detailed studies of
by real-time ultrasonography demonstrate a fetus’s exploratory
sensation-testing to touch their own body, their face, the pla-
centa, umbilicus, and the uterine wall with their hands at 11
weeks. They make jaw movements and swallow amniotic fluid,
expressing pleasure or disapproval at tastes, sucking and smiling
or grimacing with disgust. Complex movements of trunk, arms,
and legs position the body, and may react to movements of the
mother’s body and to the contractions of themuscles of her uterus
(Lecanuet et al., 1995; Trevarthen et al., 2006; Piontelli, 2010).
In weeks 10–14 fetal movements become differentiated into indi-
vidual, isolate actions with increasing goal-direction to particular
parts of the body (Prechtl, 2001; Piontelli, 2010). The arms and
hands “test” sensitive zones of the body, especially to the face and
head, exploring the border of sensory innervation on the top of
the head (Piontelli, 2010, p. 61–67).
In singleton pregnancies motor planning of action patterns
adapted for different goals is evident before 22 weeks gestational
age (Zoia et al., 2007). In twin pregnancies, movements directed
by one twin to the other are “carefully” slowed, even by 18
weeks, which the researchers interpret as evidence of a primary
“social awareness” (Castiello et al., 2010). At this time the motor
centers of the brain stem and spinal cord are directing the coor-
dinated behavior of the fetus (Okado, 1980). Neocotical cells do
not develop dendrites until after 26 weeks of gestation (Hevner,
2000).
This natural history of humanmovement at a stage of develop-
ment when the sensori-motor environment can only be the prop-
erties of an organized body itself appears to support Lashley’s con-
clusion that propositional thought may depend on, and indeed be
derived from, the spontaneous syntactic ordering of movement
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sequences (Lashley, 1951, p. 122). The fetus has an imaginative
“motor intelligence” and can formulate orderly projects without
neocortical skills.
Expressions in fetuses, in addition to twisting movements
of distress and tentative exploration by touch, give evidence
of emotions—of discomfort, curiosity or pleasure, adapted for
communication of interests and feelings. In the third trimester,
movements of the face visualized by 4D ultrasound develop into
complexes that define a “cry face gestalt” or a “laughter gestalt,”
expressing emotions that will communicate powerfully immedi-
ately after birth in the regulation of parental care (Reissland et al.,
2011). Maternal hunger with depletion of energy supply to the
fetus drives “anxious” patterns of fetal movement. The mother
and the fetus are already affectively connected. These discoveries
prompt a revolution in psychological theory and medical ethics.
There is a consensus in modern paediatrics that by 24 weeks the
fetus should be considered a conscious agent deserving the same
standard of sympathetic medical care as adults (Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010).
READINESS FOR SUPPORT OF THE BODY IN RHYTHMS OF MOVEMENT,
AWARE OF SURROUNDINGS, AND ATTENTIVE TO HUMAN COMPANY
IN MOVEMENT
Infants demonstrate the regulations of an innate time for life in
movement. Research on their dynamics and coordination with a
parent’smovements have led to a natural science of human “musi-
cality” (Trehub, 1990; Papoušek, 1996; Malloch, 1999; Malloch
and Trevarthen, 2009). Inspired by discoveries of precise analy-
sis of films, revealing self-synchrony of movements of individ-
ual actors and inter-synchrony between actors in conversations
(Birdwhistell, 1970; Jaffe and Felstein, 1970; Condon and Ogston,
1971) researchers found that infants and adults share matching
rhythms (Condon and Sander, 1974; Beebe et al., 1985; Jaffe et al.,
2001). One remarkable video recording made by Saskia van Rees
of a 2 month premature infant in precisely timed coordination
of dialogue of simple “coo” sounds vividly demonstrates how this
shared sense of time for combining syllables in phrases may lead
to a narrative in wordless dialogue (Trevarthen, 1999).
Two bands of time are shown to be fundamental in dia-
logues, games and songs between young infants and their parents
(Trevarthen, 1999, 2009b). Faster rhythms of syllables and phrases
in speech and song, or dancing steps and gestures, correspond
with arm and hand grasping for object manipulation, or of the
head and eye rotations that perform visual inspection. These
range from the median syllable frequency of 1.5–3 per second—
the same as a running or fast stepping, a glance or eyebrow rise, a
laugh or a hand wave—to every 3–5 s for a visual scan, a manipu-
lative sequence, a phrase of speaking or song, and a cycle of deep
breathing. These are somato-motor coordinations that achieve
use of the environment and pickup of information for perception,
or of a communicative message, in the “psychological present,”
the “here and now” of consciousness in action.
Slower periods of sensed vitality, as expressed in the “extended
present” of an episode in a story, a verse of singing or a stanza
of poetry, occupy 10–25 s. Longer times of imagined activity
and narrations form natural elements of 25–50 s in the rhyth-
mic verses, playful or calming, of baby songs in all languages.
These slower events are identified with autonomic events that
regulate arousal, hunger and wakefulness throughout life, and
regulation of the rate of heartbeat and breathing by the vagal
nerve (Delamont et al., 1999). They are accompanied by bursts
of electrical activity in the cerebral cortex that have a role in
the fluctuating experiences of dreaming. They link the imagina-
tion with the economy of life energy in the body, and with the
expressive arts.
Stern (1993, 2000, 2010) called the cycles of arousal or varia-
tions in vitality dynamics inmother infant play “emotional narra-
tives” expressing “implicit relational knowing.” Malloch analysed
the controlled patterns of change in voice qualities and pitch of
the voices of mothers and infants in dialogues and baby songs as
“narratives” that, “allow two persons to share a sense of passing
time, and to create and share the emotional envelopes that evolve
through this shared time. They express innate motives for shar-
ing emotion and experience with other persons and for creating
meaning in joint activity.” (Malloch, 1999, p. 45). These shared
“routines” are identified by Bruner (1999) as the medium for ref-
erence in language. We have recently been finding evidence of the
same “narrative” cycles of arousal in the “general movements” of
newborn infants, which may be shared with a sensitive mother
who coordinates with her baby by modulated vocal sounds,
touches or rocking. They participate in tides of consciousness of
being together that later will regulate the changes of meaning in a
story or the recollections of episodic memory (Delafield-Butt and
Trevarthen, 2013; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013).
SENSORI-MOTOR DIS-COORDINATION IN AUTISM, FROM
INFANCY
DEFICIT IN PROSPECTIVEMOTOR CONTROL IN AUTISM AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPING INTENTIONALITY AND LEARNING
The complex disorder of childhood autism, and how it has serious
effects on a young child’s life, may be described as follows:
“By about one to two years after birth . . . at a time when infants
usually become acutely aware of other people and what they are
doing, full of playful imagination and eager for new experiences,
these babies became strangely self-contained or isolated in their
own world and increasingly unresponsive or irritable, and diffi-
cult to understand; their vocalizations movements often seemed
repetitious and pointless, and their gestures and postures were also
odd. Throughout their childhood they continued to express them-
selves in ways that made parents, teachers and other children feel
unable to make contact.
As pre-schoolers, the children are not insensitive to others or
unaffectionate, and they can show strong likes and dislikes for
particular people. Sometimes they imitate or seek to interact, but
never in a free and easy way, and sometimes with a peculiar rit-
ualistic insistence, and remarkable inattention to their effects on
other people. Strange postures and movements and a need for
sameness, combined with obsessive interest in certain objects and
experiences, cut them off from others. At times they seem to be
in a trance, “floating off,” “looking” or “listening” when nothing
is there, often with strange flapping of the hands, or an enigmatic
smile, and they only make unintelligible baby-like vocalizations.
They may get into inexplicable panics and seem very distressed,
anxious or terrified, especially when forced to have close con-
tact with people or in strange environments. In general they do
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not like, or fear, unfamiliar places or routines. They protest at
irregularities in their world and repeat seemingly trivial actions
for their own interest. Some, in panicky states or anger, may injure
themselves. Most of the time, however, they seem content to amuse
themselves, often performing favorite actions over and over. Their
behaviors can be frightening and distressing to parents who need
help to understand what is wrong and how to cope with a child
who looks healthy enough, but who won’t respond.”
(Trevarthen et al., 1998, p. 1–2).
Odd behaviors like these are seen in children who do not have
autism, but they aremomentary and easily regulated by the child’s
playful resourcefulness or by affectionate attentions of parents,
and in shared enjoyment with other children. The autistic child
has persistent problems in both self-regulated actions and emo-
tions, and in awareness of other person’s intentions, interests
and feelings. There are conflicting ideas on the causes of these
problems and how to respond, especially for the early stages.
Disorders of movement in children with autism particularly
affect expressive movements in communication (Ricks andWing,
1975; Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Gillberg and Coleman, 1992;
Frith and Frith, 1999; Oller et al., 2010). These have lead to an
interpretation in terms of a deficit in “executive functioning”
(Rumsey, 1985) attributed to a developmental fault in the frontal
lobes that manifests itself in the second year. Recent data point to
amore basic and probably earlier developing deficit in prospective
control of movements (Mari et al., 2003; Rinehart et al., 2006a;
Dowd et al., 2012; Gowen and Hamilton, 2013). For example,
in an automated vocal analysis of a large body of data recorded
from natural expressive behavior of infants 10–50 months of age,
Oller et al. (2010) identified massive delay in development of
movements of vocal articulation in children developing autism or
language delay. Such disorders affecting communication behavior
can be explained as originating as faults in the timing and inte-
gration capacities of the brainstem sensorimotor system, which
develops prenatally and affords prospective control for later devel-
opments in psychological functions. Failure in cognitive strategies
of “action planning” and “action execution” (e.g., Rinehart et al.,
2001; Nazarali et al., 2009) attributable to change in mirror neu-
ron systems (e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2007; Fabbri-Destro et al.,
2009), require higher-order cortical processing, which develops
after birth.
Children with ASD differ from typically developing children in
the efficiency of three types of prospective motor control:
(i) Generation of single actions, such as when extending the
hand to touch, or indicate, an object of interest;
(ii) Organization of a series of actions to perform more complex
tasks or projects, including speaking, and
(iii) Simultaneous coordination of multiple action units to achieve
coherent purpose, as in postural accommodations when
standing or walking.
Simple “action units” and serially organized “action chains” both
require precise coordination of muscle actions that are conceived
or imagined “ahead-in-time” so that they achieve a desired future
effect efficiently (Bernstein, 1967; von Hofsten, 1993; Lee, 2009).
And an integrative control of movement is a necessary foun-
dation for learning more advanced and complex tasks, such as
speaking and reading (von Hofsten, 2004, 2007). Awareness of
others’ intentions requires detecting prospective control in their
movements, and this is apparent in how infants participate in
dialog and games (Trevarthen, 1986b). Failure to time move-
ments prospectively and meet expectation in movement will
thwart efficient goal acquisition, confuse awareness and frustrate
a sense of success, causing negative emotions of self-protection
and avoidance (Bower et al., 1970; Rovee-Collier et al., 1978).
(i) Evidence for disturbance in prospective control of single action
units.
Autistic persons exhibit significant differences in the tim-
ing and patterning of single movements (Rinehart et al., 2001,
2006a; Mari et al., 2003; Nazarali et al., 2009; Dowd et al., 2012).
The type of disturbance varies with the task and the sub-group
examined. For example, in a reach-to-grasp task individuals with
ASD grouped by low or average to high intellectual ability, with
full-scale I.Q. scores below and above 80, exhibited different
kinematics, and both groups acted significantly less efficiently
than typically developing children (Mari et al., 2003). Differences
between ASD groups were thought to reflect different compen-
satory coping strategies for a primary deficit in motor planning.
The autistic individuals also failed to coordinate the two sub-
actions in the reach-to-grasp task, i.e., reaching of the arm and
the opening of the fingers. They performed one act and then
the other separately. Typical children coordinate the sequence of
arm and hand actions in “pre-reaching” and gesturing fluently
from early infancy (Trevarthen, 1984; Rönnqvist and vonHofsten,
1994; Prechtl, 2001).
(ii) Evidence for disturbance in serial organization of multiple
action units.
The progressive planning of “action chains” communicate
intentions. When we see someone grasping a bottle, for example,
the initial reaching movement of the arm differs depending on
whether the goal is to shelve it or to serve some wine (Jeannerod,
1999). The postural preparation of the body and extension of
the arm, with shifts of gaze, are adjusted from the start in dif-
ferent ways depending on the final goal. Children with ASD have
deficits in this preparatory coordination for motor sequencing or
action chaining (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Fabbri-Destro et al., 2009).
Typically developing children, when asked to perform an object
manipulation task, such as turning an upside-down drinking glass
right-side up, adjust their body posture at the start of the action so
that their final posture is comfortable (Rosenbaum et al., 1990).
Children with autism begin with a comfortable posture and con-
clude it in an uncomfortable one, suggesting a deficit of motor
“knowledge” of how the action will proceed.
Cattaneo and colleagues (2007) used electromyographic
recordings of the mylohyoid muscle movements that lower the
jaw and raise the tongue for reaching-to-grasp-to-eat, and they
compared this sequence with the muscle activity during a move-
ment of reaching-to-grasp-to-place. They found that typically-
developing children anticipated eating the food with mylohyoid
activation beginning well before their hand had grasped the piece
of food. In contrast, this activation did not start in children with
ASD until the food was already grasped in the hand and traveling
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toward their mouth, demonstrating a failure to couple the action
chains efficiently. This lack of anticipation was also evident when
the children were asked to watch another person perform the
reach-to-grasp-to-eat action. The mylohyoid activation occurred
in typically-developing children at the onset of the other’s move-
ment toward the food, but in autistic individuals there was no
mylohyoid activation at all.
(iii) Evidence for failure in simultaneous integration of multiple
action units.
Measurements of children’s postural adjustments and muscle
tensions during load shifting shows that prospective control of
whole-body posture and perception of body-space goals, which
require synchronizing and co-ordinating action units through-
out the body in shifts of the legs, chest, back, and arms, are
also disrupted in autism (Schmitz et al., 2003). Disturbances of
prospective control for the whole body are confirmed by data on
gait differences in individuals with autism, showing an increase
stride length and variability of the width of stride, but also sig-
nificant differences in postural adjustments of the upper-body
to maintain balance (Hallett et al., 1993; Vernazza-Martin et al.,
2005; Rinehart et al., 2006b; Calhoun et al., 2011; Nayate et al.,
2011). They also have difficulties in perceiving the environmental
context for their movements (Gowen and Hamilton, 2013).
DIFFERENCES IN PROSPECTIVEMOTOR TIMING AFFECT SOCIAL
EXPECTATIONAND UNDERSTANDING
The subtle deficits in prospective motor control of children
with ASD must be involved in the symptoms of social isola-
tion and emotional distress that they show. They have difficul-
ties in communicating their intention in gestural acts, and in
sensing the dynamics of another’s intentions from their move-
ments (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Zalla et al., 2010; Gowen, 2012).
Imitation-based or interaction therapies for ASD employing sen-
sitive response to signs of intended movement are able to assist
because they facilitate both anticipation of actions and psycho-
logical and emotional connection (Escalona et al., 2002; Nadel,
2006; Zeedyk, 2008; Field et al., 2011; Solomon et al., 2012). The
therapist acts to excite anticipation, which simplifies and supports
the performance of desired actions. It also explains why insistence
on evidence from repeated measures of performance in tasks to
test perceptual preferences or cognitive mastery can fail to detect
or explain the cause of failure (Wigram and Gold, 2012). Such
external measures, focusing on achievement of goals or response
to facts, neglect the temporo-spatial phenomena of prospective
motor control within the subject.
Problems of intentionality and its perceptual guidance in
autism, and pathological defense against sensory overload
(Rosenhall et al., 1999; Foxton et al., 2003), may be due to faults
in motor regulations of sense organs; of the inner ear to adjust
the sensitivity of hearing, and of head and eye movements to
control selection of detail by foveal fixation which is guided by
pick-up of global information from the ambient field. Hearing
and production of speech sounds, which autism impairs in differ-
ing degrees, is particularly demanding, requiring detection and
control of affective expression transmitted by small modulations
in the timbre, pitch and loudness of vowel sounds, and their con-
straint by consonants produced in rapid sequences to articulate
intelligible words in information-rich phrases. Autism, however,
interferes not only with the motor controls of selective hearing
and seeing, but with attention to all the expressive movements of
other persons.
In high functioning persons with autism, exceptional abilities
in detecting, separating and combining visual details or pitches
of sounds (O’Riordan et al., 2001; Bonnel et al., 2003; Mottron
et al., 2006) may be a consequence of compensatory hypertro-
phy in higher cortical sensory systems driven by a bias to detect
affective self-related feedback or support. Ockleford’s experience
with supporting exceptional performative talents in autistic chil-
dren who cannot speak suggest that pleasure from control of pitch
in sounds from musical instruments activates a primary reward
system different from that which discriminates speech compo-
nents (Ockleford, 2012, 2013). In confrontation with another, a
person with autism avoids looking at the eyes, directing atten-
tion to the mouth (Senju and Johnson, 2009). Given that rapid
movements of the eyes transmit important information about
the direction and intensity of interest, in preparation for shifts
in locomotion, posture or reaching by hand, as well as selec-
tive attention to individuals in a group, they implicate tracking
of sequences of intended action to engage with others’ prospec-
tive control in thought and action (Bal et al., 2010). Lower face
expressions and mouth movements express affect and are essen-
tial for emotional sympathy. They attract attention of an observer
for judging another person’s feelings.
Failure to appreciate playful teasing and humor and avoidant
or defensive reaction to strangers, as well as preference for famil-
iar surroundings and consistency in placement of objects or
execution of routines, characteristics of ASD, all point to a distur-
bance of imaginative curiosity for prospects of action. They are
as much disorders of self-regulation of pleasurable movement-
with-awareness as of affective other-awareness, and they impair
intentional and emotional engagement (Hobson and Hobson,
2011; Reddy, 2011)
DISORDERS OF AUTISM IN THE FIRST YEAR
Teitelbaum and colleagues (1998, 2002), studying home movies
of infants later diagnosed as autistic, made a comparative analy-
sis of the developmental stages of turning over, crawling, sitting,
standing and walking, which infants typically master in the first
year. Using the Eshkol-Wachman Movement Notation for tem-
poral and spatial parameters of human body movement they
showed deficits in whole body control and sequencing of the
movements of trunk, head and limbs to control balance and
posture changes, which were interpreted as disordered sensory-
motor reflexes. These detailed observations have been helpful
for parents who suspect their infant may be developing autism,
assisting them to engage the attention of medical specialists and
therapists (Teitelbaum and Teitelbaum, 2008)
Similar disturbance of anticipatory regulations of whole body
postures were found by Danon-Boileau (2007) in films made of
two sisters while they were being bathed by their mother; one,
at five months, who later developed autism, and the other who
developed normally, at 3 months. The films show the anxiety and
awkwardness of the first girl who scarcely looked at her mother,
and an analysis of the mother’s speech shows she was not “in
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contact” and was using her voice with a detached tone, to draw
response.With the normally developing sister themother’s speech
is lively and addressed to the child as person seeking to share the
experience. This infant keeps eye contact with the mother and
reacts expressively. Similar observations were made in an anal-
ysis of home movies of identical twin girls at 10 months, when
their father was helping them to walk or playing a game with them
in the family living room (Trevarthen and Daniel, 2005; St. Clair
et al., 2007). One girl later diagnosed as autistic, and who did not
speak until the age of 3, showed clear delay in motor coordina-
tion for stepping and for regulation of her sitting posture. She
lacked attention to other persons’ eyes and made fleeting smiles
and she could not participate in a teasing game with her father
that required anticipation of his rhythmically phrased behaviors
and speech. The rhythms and expressions in response to teasing
and tickling with the father were different from those of the typ-
ically developing twin, and the father was unable to reciprocate,
creating confusion in games and interactions. Her sister who had
a mild retardation at school age, developed normally through the
first years showing no evidence of autism.
The lack of responsive attention by the infant developing
autism to her father’s attempts to play caused him to become
irregular and insistent in his solicitations, which afterwards he
could see only confused the child. The same transformation of
parents’ responses to avoidant or disengaged behavior of an infant
developing autism have been noted in other studies of home
movies and in prospective studies of siblings of autistic children,
i.e., a change to a more insistent and monotonous mode that tries
to excite a response (Baranek, 1999; Saint-Georges et al., 2010,
2011). For example, there is a lack of the affective modulation
of the parent’s voice in speech to an infant who later develops
autism (Mahdhaoui et al., 2011). Disorder in development of the
child’s vocal control on the way to mastery of speech, such as
that demonstrated by Oller et al. (2010) for the crucial period
from 1–4 years, will affect the parents ability to share talking, and
prompt them to use stimulating or coercive ways of engaging with
the child.
Two research strategies have been used to search for evidence
of abnormal development before medical diagnosis is possi-
ble: prospective study of the infant siblings of older children
with autism. The two procedures confirm important conclu-
sions about manifestations of autistic disorder that are devel-
oping in the first 18 months after birth (Zwaigenbaum et al.,
2005; Saint-Georges et al., 2010). They highlight effects of the
“flatness” and lack of seeking for engagement and also changes
associated with the phases of motor development which were
recorded by Teitelbaum (Teitelbaum et al., 1998, 2002), and
the development of interest in objects. Attention to objects was
normal in the first six months in infants developing autism
when their attention to social engagement was significantly low
(Maestro et al., 2002). There is a specific loss of interest in other
persons” expressions early in infancy (Muratori and Maestro,
2007).
Expression of intentions and affects is achieved with cross-
modal fluency between voice and gesture that promotes sym-
pathetic action and shared experience with “affect attunement”
(Trevarthen, 1986b, 2009a; Tronick, 1989; Stern, 2000; Reddy,
2008). Expressive acts, like all goal-directed voluntary movement,
require prospective control, and by assimilation of the form and
flow of the movements of the body and voice of one subject
states of intention, affect, arousal and interest are conveyed to the
awareness of the other in “felt immediacy” (Bråten, 2009; Stern,
2010; Trevarthen et al., 2011). If predictive control of the timing
and harmonization of these expressive body movements are dis-
rupted, then psycho-motor attunement with the perceptual and
motor experiences of others will be confused.
Magnetic resonance imaging of the brains of autistic children
indicate reduction in size of the brainstem and midbrain at birth,
a loss of tissue more than compensated for by excessive growth
of the brain as a whole postnatally (Hashimoto et al., 1995).
Detailed neuroanatomical investigation of brains from children
with ASD also indicate limbic midbrain structures and brain-
stem regions are affected (Rodier and Arndt, 2005). Of particular
note is an abnormality in the inferior olivary nucleus, a promi-
nent lower brainstem nucleus known to be involved in perceiving
and controlling of the timing of movement (Welsh et al., 1995),
indicating a likely primary site of disruption underpinning ASD
motor deficit (Welsh et al., 2005).
The data on motor impairments in ASD and their early man-
ifestation in infancy confirm a primary deficit in the capacity to
perceive and move the body in a planned way, which limits the
capacity to control the timing of actions of the body and their
perceptual consequences, and thence impairs the communication
of intentions and ideas.
AN INTERACTIVE RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THERAPY
AND TEACHING, NURTURING INTIMACY AND CREATIVEY
OF MOVEMENT
“Musical structure in improvisation can provide a framework for
creative development, and . . .more creative skills may well-emerge
given a structure than one might see from a purely free form of
improvisation—where a lack of direction andmodel may leave the
“non-musician” client struggling to find out how they can “create”
music.... Creativity is a key process in improvisational music ther-
apy, and demands substantial skill and flexibility in the therapists
to nurture in clients for therapeutic benefit.”
(Wigram, 2006).
Interactive music therapy for both diagnosis and treatment of
autism indicates that the aim of a therapist or teacher is to provide
support for creativity, and that this requires both a “direction and
model” and “skill and flexibility.” It requires a guide that protects
the learner from “struggling to find out how they can create.” And
it requires descriptive evidence from single case studies (Wigram
and Gold, 2012). In the controversial field of therapy for chil-
dren with autism there is a bewildering range of theories and
advice for procedures, which range from strict teaching of skills
to control disordered actions and feelings and to coax commu-
nication, to permissive environments where possible distractions
are eliminated and attempts are made to give comfort (Trevarthen
et al., 1998; Teitelbaum andTeitelbaum, 2008). Given the evidence
that the core deficit in autism concerns prospective sensori-motor
control and affective self-regulation, especially for activities of
communication, we focus our final comments on evidence that
intimate or intensive engagement with the impulses of affected
children in ways that bring pleasure from control of actions and
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mutual recognition may bring benefit for creative learning of
practical skills and artificial rituals of shared experience, including
language.
Finely measured pulse, form and flow of the enactments of
the sensuous body and voice convey psychological states of inten-
tion, affect, arousal, and interest (Trevarthen, 1986a,b; Stern,
2010; Trevarthen et al., 2011; Hardy and Blythe LaGasse, 2013).
Gestures made in communication are controlled and directed in
body-space and by selecting transitory goals with precise timing
of muscular energies that display affective content in “narrative”
sequences (Schögler et al., 2008; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt,
2013). It follows that, if the common control of body move-
ments is disrupted, then the individual will have difficulty finding
psycho-motor attunement with the perceptual and motor experi-
ences of typical others.
Understanding of the fundamental and deeply felt disorder
in autism as failure of integrative brain activity for carrying
out sensori-motor intentions with ease and creativity, that it is
a disorder that also affects communicative expression and per-
ceiving the motor intentions of others, may help explain how
intensive, imitation-based therapies attentive to emotions may be
effective and may foster enjoyable response and interest (Nind,
1999; Field et al., 2002, 2011; Nadel, 2006; Nordoff and Robbins,
2007; Zeedyk, 2008; Caldwell, 2010; Frank and Trevarthen, 2012;
Lüdtke, 2012; Solomon et al., 2012). By consciously “attuning” to
themotor acts of the autistic patient and feeling their affective and
intentional content in “intense interaction,” before re-enacting
creative collaborations with adaptation to responses, the therapist
provides an exterior pattern of actions that are timed and directed
sensitively to compensate for repetition of uncertain, anxious
attempts (Hardy and Blythe LaGasse, 2013). A responsive, “lis-
tening” makes communication possible, as well as progress to
new self-confident and joyful experience, which may free an
exceptional talent (Ockleford, 2013).
Sensorimotor attunement in therapy embodies men-
tal/affective components as much as it does the motor expression,
and in so doing is able to open up a co-regulation of arousals,
interests, and intentions in a person otherwise unavailable and
isolated. All movements are considered valid expressions of pur-
poseful states, and even stereotypies are regarded as affective
sensori-motor acts capable of initiating communication, not
disregarded an unintentional, non-mental motor acts. As the
therapist attends to the movements of the person, attuning to
them with her own body movements, so they begin to gen-
erate an implicit, affective, and inter-subjective psycho-motor
connection. Such therapy can aid not only the autistic child
to achieve communication, but can be of great help to a par-
ent. It may bring an autistic person of any age and to more
self-confident and articulate participation in an intimate com-
munity of knowledge (Frank and Trevarthen, 2012; Lüdtke,
2012).
It is the experience of any therapist who works with persons
suffering from autism that a conscious care must be taken to
“stand back” and allow any impulse the child or adultmay show to
take its course, indeed shadowing or mirroring it to aid its moti-
vation. This is the principle put into the practice of interactive
music therapy (Robarts, 1998; Wigram and Gold, 2006; Nordoff
and Robbins, 2007; Wigram and Elefant, 2009; Ockleford, 2013).
A more explicit standing back, called “asocial,” is practiced by the
method developed by the paediatric neurologist Waldon to assist
persons with a wide range of disabilities in acting and thinking.
The therapist places him or herself behind the client, holding the
arms to guide the hands in performance of tasks to move objects
in such a way that a goal or project is completed bringing a sense
of satisfaction. This method has proved effective in helping young
children overcome the confusion and isolation of autism in a way
that makes productive and progressive motor learning possible
(Solomon et al., 2012).
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